“IMPRESENTABLES” – Referencias bibliográficas

• [1] Pasos a realizar FNMT (copia archive.org)
• [2] www.cert.fnmt.es/aeat/ (copia archive.org)
• [3] Renta 98: comprobación de la huella digital de la FNMT (copia archive.org)
• [4] https://aeat.es:8000/renta98/irpf128.html (enlace inactivo)
• [5] Obtener certificados electrónicos – persona física FNMT
• [6] The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow and Trusted Third-Party Encryption Varios autores, 27/5/1997
• [7] Key recovery Berk-Jaap Koops, 1999 (copia archive.org)
• [8] Escrowed Encryption and Related Issues (copia archive.org)
• [9] The Copenhagen Hearing April 23 – 24 1998
• [10] Towards A European Framework for Digital Signatures And Encryption Documento COM (97) 503 de la Comisión Europea, 1997
• [11] Cryptography and Liberty 1999 Electronic Privacy Information Center, 1999
• [12] Computers, Freedom + Privacy 1999 (copia archive.org)
• [13] Key Recovery Alliance – FAQs (copia archive.org)
• [14] Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (an appraisal of technologies of political control), parte 1 Nikos Bogonikolos, mayo 1999
• [15] Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (an appraisal of technologies of political control), parte 2 Chris Elliott, 1999
• [16] Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (an appraisal of technologies of political control), parte 3 Franck Leprévost, 1999
• [17] Interception Capabilities 2000 Duncan Campbell, 2000
• [18] Crypto Law Survey Berk-Jaap Koops, 2001 (copia archive.org)
• [19] ¡No al artículo 52! Criptografía libre, criptografía segura Fronteras Electrónicas España, 1998 (copia archive.org)
• [20] Is key escrow dead? Recent developments in the European Union and in Germany Ulrich Sandl (copia archive.org)
• [21] The Walsh Report Electronic Frontiers Australia
• [22] Encryption and Law Enforcement mayo 1999 (copia archive.org)
• [23] Electronic Communications Bill Cámara de los Comunes, sesión 1999-2000
• [24] La Ley General de Telecomunicaciones deja la puerta abierta a los sistemas obligatorios de almacenamiento centralizado de claves Fronteras Electrónicas España 1998 (copia archive.org)
• [25] Boletín de Kriptópolis nº 133 José Manuel Gómez, 20/9/1999 (copia archive.org)
• [26] Boletín de Kriptópolis nº 136 José Manuel Gómez, 1/10/1999 (copia archive.org)
• [27] Boletín de Kriptópolis nº 137 José Manuel Gómez, 8/10/1999 (copia archive.org)
• [28] Russian hacker arrested Bruce Schneier, 23/7/2001
• [29] http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/can/press/html/2001_12_12_sklyarov.html (enlace inactivo)
• [30] US v. ElcomSoft Sklyarov Electronic Frontier Foundation
• [31] https://simonsingh.net
• [32] Security analysis of a cryptographically-enabled RFID device Varios autores, enero 2005
• [33] Opening keyless car entry systems Bruce Schneier, 27/9/2006
• [34] “Vamos a abrir el coche” Arturo Quirantes, Boletín Enigma nº 47 (incluye la secuencia de de Brujin original)
• [35] On the power of simple branch prediction analysis Onur Actnçmez, Çetin Kaya Koç y Jean-Pierre Seifert, 2006
• [36] The story of non-secret encryption J. H. Ellis, 1987
• [37] VISA dice basta a los robos de tarjetas en la red Mercé Molist, 13/11/2007
• [38] Breaking the pay-TV code-breakers Neil Chetoweth, Australian Financial Review, 15/4/2002
• [39] Lest we remember: cold boot attacks on encryption keys Varios autores, 2008
• [40] CITP- Universidad de Princeton (copia archive.org)
• [41] Fermilab coded letter (copia archive.org)
• [42] Firefox 3: site identification button Deb Richardson, 6/5/2008 (copia archive.org)
• [43] Problemas con certificados SSL y Firefox 3 barrapunto.com, 28/6/2008 (copia archive.org)
• [44] Problema con Firefox 3 y los certificados digitales Fernando Acero, kriptopolis.com, 29/6/2008
• [45] Tom Berson
• [46] Fault-based attack of RSA authentication Andrea Pellegrini, Valeria Bertacco y Todd Austin, marzo 2010
• [47] Terry Childs: Admin gone rogue Inforworld.com (copia archive.org)
• [48] Fusion_Image_v124.zip (copia archive.org)
• [49] www.characterfrequencyanalyzer.com (enlace inactivo)
• [50] multimatter.com/tools/frequency.php  (enlace inactivo)
• [51] Thuraya (Wikipedia)
• [52] Inmarsat (Wikipedia)
• [53] La seguridad de los teléfonos móviles Arturo Quirantes, Boletín ENIGMA nº 22, 1/4/2004
• [54] Forensic security analysis of Google Wallet viaforensics.com, 12/12/2011 (copia archive.org)
• [55] Google Wallet security: PIN exposure vulnerability zvelo.com, 8/2/2012
• [56] Protecting your payments with Google Wallet Google Commerce blog, 10/2/2012
• [57] Second major security flaw found in Google Wallet… rooted or not no one is safe The Smartphone Champ, 9/2/2012 (copia archive.org)
• [58] Un físico reta a los ‘hackers’ Mónica Collado, El Mundo, 17/1/2013
• [59] Un físico inventa un sistema de criptografía a prueba de «hackers» ABC, 18/1/2013
• [60] Un físico patenta un sistema de criptografía a prueba de “hackers” Mónica Collado, La Información, 17/1/2013
• [61] Patente valenciana antipiratas Miquel Alberola, El País, 3/1/2013
• [62] WO2012152956 “Procedimiento de doble criptograma simétrico de seguridad de Shannon por codificación de información para transmisión telemática y electrónica” WIPO IP Portal
• [63] Criptografía “Made in Spain” Foro kriptopolis.com, 4/1/2013 (copia archive.org)
• [64] Apuntadas posibles vulnerabilidades en nuevo sistema español basado en criptografía de residuos Foro kriptopolis.com, 13/1/2013 (copia archive.org)
• [65] Teorema de los residuos (Wikipedia)
• [66] Cuando la criptografía falla Arturo Quirantes Sierra
• [67] Cómo funciona la seguridad en Mega Linux para noveles, 22/1/2013
• [68] A word on cryptography mega.io, 22/1/2013
• [69] mega.co.nz (enlace inactivo)
• [70] *.static.co.nz/ (enlace inactivo)
• [71] MegaCracker Steve Thomas
• [72] Imagen
• [73] Anatomy of a password disaster – Adobe’s giant-sized cryptographic blunder Pauk Ducklin, Naked Security, 4/11/2013
• [74] Encryptic xkcd.com
• [75] How an epic blunder by Adobe could strengthen hand of password crackers Dan Goodin, Ars Technica, 11/1/2013
• [76] The NSA’s work to make crypto worse and better Ars Technica, 6/9/2013
• [77] Report: NSA paid RSA to make flawed crypto algorithm the default Ars Technica, 21/12/2013
• [78] We don’t enable backdoors in our crypto products, RSA tells customers Dan Goodin, Ars Technica, 20/9/2013
• [79] How the NSA (may have) put a backdoor in RSA’s cryptography: A technical primer Nick Sullivan, Ars Technica, 6/1/2014
• [80] Policía y fiscalía descubren códigos secretos utilizados por narcotraficantes Javiera Matus, La Tercera (Chile), 21/3/2014 (copia archive.org)
• [81] Tracking the FREAK attack (copia archive.org)
• [82] Factoring as a service Universidad de Pensilvania
• [83] Intercambio de claves Diffie-Hellman Imagen de Benutzer:DaMutz, Wikimedia Commons
• [84] Attack of the week: Logjam Matthew Green, 22/5/2015
• [85] The NSA Is building the country’s biggest spy center (watch what you say) James Bamford, Wired, 15/3/2012
• [86] ‘Black budget’ summary details U.S. spy network’s successes, failures and objectives Barton Gellman y Greg Miller, The Washington Post, 29/8/2013
• [87] Turmoil VPN processing Der Spiegel
• [88] Zona ENFOPOL Arturo Quirantes Sierra, Taller de Criptografía
• [89] krebsonsecurity.com
• [90] Project Shield
• [91] DYN statement on 10/21/2016 DDos attack DYN (copia archive.org)
• [92] Security economics of the internet of things Bruce Schneier, 16/10/2016
• [93] DDoS attacks against Dyn Bruce Schneier, 22/10/2016
• [94] Someone is learning how to take down the Internet Bruce Schneier, 13/11/2016
• [95] New KRACK attack against Wi-Fi encryption Bruce Schneier, 16/10/2017
• [96] Majority of Android VPNs can’t be trusted to make users more secure Dan Goodin, Ars Technica, 28/1/2017
• [97] Key reinstalation attacks – demonstration Mathy Vanhoef, 2017